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In the opening months of President Donald Trump’s second term, he and many of his senior officials have emphasized what they view as an imbalance in global burden-sharing between the US and its partners and allies. Equally important, they believe the defense of the US homeland has been neglected by previous administrations — especially the border. To address these concerns, the administration signaled early on that it would release a new Global Posture Review and a National Defense Strategy this year, with publication expected “by the end of the summer.”

It has been nearly four years since the last Global Posture Review was released in November 2021. Reviews are useful — ensuring US strategy, forces and equipment remain aligned with evolving threats — but the forthcoming documents must avoid idealistic frameworks disconnected from geopolitical realities.

Inside the second Trump administration, competing schools of thought are shaping the debate. The first, drawn from the traditional Republican foreign policy establishment, maintains a hawkish, robust view of America’s global role. This camp is smaller than in past administrations but it still has influence with the president, as seen with the recent strikes against Iran’s nuclear program.

The second — likely the largest in terms of numbers but best described as a plurality rather than a majority — consists of isolationists, who argue for disengaging from overseas commitments, reducing defense spending and bringing US troops home, often framing border security as the central national security challenge.

Beyond the symbolism of shifting US forces from certain regions to the Indo-Pacific, the reality is more complicated

Luke Coffey

The third, who are increasingly influential, are the “prioritizers” that see China’s rise in the Indo-Pacific as the paramount threat. They argue that all tools and resources must be concentrated on this challenge, even if that means scaling back America’s responsibilities or interests in Europe and the Middle East.

In the posture debate, isolationists and prioritizers are clearly setting the pace. Among those two camps, the prioritizers appear best positioned to carry the day: more of their supporters are embedded in the Department of War (formerly known as the Department of Defense) and are helping shape the posture review and strategy. But beyond the symbolism of drawing down US forces in certain regions and shifting them to the Indo-Pacific, the reality is more complicated.

A majority of the US Navy’s combat power is already oriented toward the Indo-Pacific. Meanwhile, the overwhelming share of America’s ground forces are based on the continental US. It is misleading to suggest America has large numbers of troops idly stationed abroad, ready to be redeployed to Asia.

There is also the practical dilemma of resourcing and funding large troop movements. The last significant reduction in Europe occurred in 2013, when President Barack Obama announced a cut of 10,000 US troops on the continent. Crucially, he did not plan to relocate those forces back to the US — a move that would have demanded new schools, housing, medical facilities and community services for thousands of troops and families. Instead, the overall army end strength was reduced. Trump, by contrast, has committed to maintaining — if not expanding — the current size of the military, making such a reduction politically infeasible.

Relocating forces from Europe or the Middle East to the Indo-Pacific would be even more costly. Creating the infrastructure for thousands of service members and their families is far more expensive in parts of East Asia, especially on remote Pacific islands. Even in well-developed hubs like Japan or South Korea, any addition to US posture would require years of consultation and coordination with those governments. The logistics and political complexity involved far exceed those required simply to move units back to the US.

In Europe, one plausible outcome would be trimming rotational deployments and rotating more of those units to Asia. Today, there are nearly 85,000 US service members in Europe, of whom about 20,000 are on rotational deployments — figures that fluctuate with exercises and crisis events. But such a policy would clash with Trump’s recent pledge, alongside Poland’s president, that US forces would not only remain in Poland but that their number might even increase — because most of the US presence there is rotational.

Decisions should be grounded in geopolitical realities rather than placating the different views inside the government

Luke Coffey

The Middle East presents another dilemma. America’s military footprint there is already a fraction of what it was two decades ago. Yet there is a perception among many Americans that large numbers of troops remain stationed in the region. In reality, only a modest presence persists. Further reductions would be shortsighted.

Syria’s future is uncertain, Iraq remains fragile, transnational terrorism has not disappeared and the Houthis continue to destabilize the region. Meanwhile, the Middle East remains vital to the global economy: energy from the region sustains US partners in Asia and some of the world’s busiest sea lanes pass through its waters. With so few forces currently deployed, pulling out more risks far more than it saves.

Europe is also too important to ignore. It remains America’s largest trading partner and the largest source of foreign direct investment into the US. The prosperity of the transatlantic economy depends in part on the stability of the European continent — stability supported by a credible US military presence. Neglecting this would undercut not only Europe but also America’s economic interests.

As the Trump administration moves to publish the new strategy and posture review, decisions should be grounded in geopolitical realities rather than placating the different views inside the government. Americans want leadership in foreign policy and, if the commander-in-chief makes a clear, compelling case for why US forces must remain forward deployed in this era of great power competition, the public will support it. But indecision, inconsistency or poor communication will inject partisanship into what should be a unifying national debate.

The White House has an opportunity to recalibrate America’s defense posture in a way that safeguards national interests, reassures allies and deters adversaries. It should seize this moment wholeheartedly.

• Luke Coffey is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. X: @LukeDCoffey