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In the past decade, Turkiye has increasingly integrated military and defense elements into its foreign policy through expanded mandates, the sale of defense industry products, and the signing of defense and military agreements. Hard power politics has become a steadier foundation for its relations with other nations, making defense a central component of its foreign policy.

Ankara’s need for a more militarily assertive approach has extended beyond its borders, driven by perceptions of immediate threats to its national security and the growing instability in its neighborhood. One of the key elements of this hard power strategy include the deployment of troops externally, in addition to the Turkish Armed Forces’ conventional role in UN and NATO missions.

This week, the Turkish Parliament approved extensions for military operations in neighboring countries to keep troops in Iraq and Syria for three more years and maintain peacekeepers in the UN Interim Force in Lebanon for an additional two years. Since 2014, the parliament has regularly renewed the cross-border mandates, typically on a yearly basis. However, the current mandate for Syria represents the longest extension since Turkiye launched its first cross-border intervention there in 2016. In Iraq, Turkish military operations date back to the 1980s when it began efforts to dismantle the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, designated as a terrorist group by Turkiye, the US, and the EU.

The mandates for Syria and Iraq have caused divisions within the parliament. The ruling Justice and Development Party and the Nationalist Movement Party supported the motion, while the Republican People’s Party and the People’s Equality and Democracy Party opposed it. However, Turkiye’s deployment to the UN peacekeeping force received broader backing.

Despite maintaining good relations with the new administration in Damascus and the government in Baghdad, Turkiye remains concerned about potential instability arising from the activities of terrorist groups, particularly the PKK and Daesh militants. The motion for Syria stated that PKK and its offshoots “refuse to take steps toward integration with the Syrian central administration due to their separatist and divisive agenda.” The extension of the mandate indicates that Syria’s new government requires international support to strengthen its counterterrorism capacity. At the same time, it reflects Turkiye’s long-term hard power strategy in Syria.

Turkiye’s hard power political approach has also coincided with instabilities ranging from the Caucasus to Africa. Today, Turkiye has its troops deployed in at least nine countries, from Syria to Iraq, Libya to Azerbaijan, and Qatar to Somalia. Since 2017, Ankara has also begun exporting Bayraktar TB2 drones, Turkiye’s first domestically developed armed uncrewed aerial vehicle. The Bayraktar TB2 played a critical role in several conflict zones, including Libya, Karabakh, and Ukraine, where it gained international recognition for its effectiveness.

Drone diplomacy has provided Ankara with a network of allies

Dr. Sinem Cengiz

Turkiye has sold TB2 to at least 34 countries, including its allies and partners in Europe, Central and South Asia, Africa, the Levant, and the Gulf. This drone diplomacy has provided Ankara with a strong network of allies across Eurasia, Africa, and the Middle East. According to the head of Turkiye’s Defense Industry Agency, Haluk Gorgun, Turkiye’s defense industry exports surpassed $7.1 billion last year, marking a milestone. Gorgun also accompanies President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on key foreign visits, the most recent being a Gulf tour that included three stops: Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman.

The hard power politics in Turkiye’s foreign policy is also a deliberate attempt to put strategic autonomy at the center. The push for autonomy has been motivated by the restrictions Turkiye has faced when it comes to buying arms from its Western allies. This week, the UK secured a deal worth up to £8 billion to supply Turkiye with 20 Typhoon fighter jets. UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer said Turkiye will receive the first of the batch of 20 Typhoons in 2030. The Eurofighter jets are jointly produced by Britain, Germany, Italy, and Spain, and the deal was subject to approval from the other members of the consortium. Erdogan hailed the agreement as “a new symbol of the strategic relations” with Britain.

The deal was signed during Starmer’s visit to Ankara and is the largest fighter jet export agreement in almost two decades. It comes as Turkiye seeks to take advantage of the advanced warplanes to make up ground with regional rivals such as Israel. Separately, Turkiye plans to buy more Typhoons from Oman and Qatar. Last week, it was also reported that Turkiye was nearing a deal to secure 12 Typhoons from Oman and Qatar to meet its immediate needs, with more new jets coming from Britain in future years.

There is also a growing tendency among Western and regional states to pursue closer defense cooperation with Turkiye. The frequent contacts between defense ministers have led to the signing of numerous defense industry agreements and memoranda of understanding in defense industry technologies and military inventory. Turkish defense products are also increasingly attractive because they come with fewer political conditions and are less influenced by the shifting agendas of some Western governments.

Thus, Turkiye’s hard power politics — encompassing defense and military cooperation — has become a critical pillar of its cooperative security agenda, which has emerged as a key instrument of its foreign policy. This approach serves multiple objectives: bringing security to the neighborhood, enhancing strategic partnerships, modernizing defense capabilities, gaining global recognition and responsibility, and countering both traditional and non-traditional threats. In an era defined by transnational security challenges, this policy has evolved from a matter of choice to a strategic necessity.

• Dr. Sinem Cengiz is a Turkish political analyst who specializes in Turkiye’s relations with the Middle East. X: @SinemCngz