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The International Criminal Court this month  a historic ruling convicting Ali Kushayb of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Darfur two decades ago. But this conviction is not just delayed accountability for a militia leader — it points to a deep wound: How did militias that were unsanctioned in 2003 transform into a legitimized military force, then into a political entity declaring a parallel government with ministers and a UN representative? The story begins with a burned Darfur and ends with a civil war tearing Sudan apart, with the thread connecting them being impunity.

Ali Mohammed Ali Abdel Rahman, known as “Ali Kushayb,” belongs to the Ta’aisha tribe of the Baggara in Darfur. In the early 2000s, Kushayb was not just a tribal leader — he was the main commander of the Janjaweed militia in the Wadi Salih area of West Darfur, while simultaneously holding leadership positions in the Popular Defense Forces and the Central Reserve Police. He led a militia of more than 10,000 fighters and participated in large-scale operations targeting the Fur, Masalit and other non-Arab communities.

Kushayb operated within a broader system, receiving orders from Ahmed Haroun, the government official who oversaw military operations in Darfur. But on the ground, relationships between Janjaweed leaders were more complex. Musa Hilal, the leader of the Mahamid clan of the Rizeigat, was the most prominent face of the Janjaweed. He was  in April 2003 by order of Vice President Ali Osman Taha, despite being convicted of killing 17 people and robbing the Central Bank of Nyala. Human Rights Watch  him as “the backbone of the government's strategy to recruit militias.”

Hilal, Kushayb and Dagalo represented the triangle that formed the Janjaweed: tribal leadership, field command and rising ambition

Areig Elhag

While Hilal enjoyed symbolic leadership and broad tribal influence, Kushayb was the field commander who executed operations on the ground. In the shadows, Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, aka Hemedti, a young trader from the Rizeigat, worked alongside Hilal during the 2003-2005 Darfur war, learning the game and building his own network. The three — Hilal, Kushayb and Dagalo — represented the triangle that formed the Janjaweed: tribal leadership, field command and rising ambition.

The court convicted Kushayb on , including hundreds of murders, the rape of dozens of women, forced displacement, torture and mass execution. The crimes occurred during 2003 and 2004 but the conviction did not come until 2025 — more than two decades later. This delay is not just a procedural detail, it is the heart of the Sudanese tragedy.

The International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Kushayb in 2007, but he remained free for another 13 years. During that period, he was not hiding in a cave — he was working as commander of the Central Reserve Forces in Rahad Al-Bardi in South Darfur. In 2020, after the fall of Omar Bashir’s regime, Kushayb fled to the Central African Republic and voluntarily surrendered to the court, citing safety concerns. This move raised questions: Did he surrender fearing revenge? Or did he receive guarantees? Some analysts believed that he might become a witness against other leaders who remain in power.

While Kushayb was being tried in The Hague, Hilal was on a different path. Instead of accountability, he got a promotion: in January 2008, the regime  him as special adviser to the interior minister. But in 2017, the Rapid Support Forces under Dagalo’s command — a son of Hilal’s own tribe — arrested him after he refused to surrender his weapons. He was  with a pardon in 2021 and, in the civil war that began in 2023, he declared his support for the army against the Rapid Support Forces, while his tribal elders announced an opposing position supporting Dagalo.

As for Dagalo, he took a completely different path. He was not tried and was not arrested — instead, he transformed from a camel trader to commander of the Rapid Support Forces in 2010, then to a European partner in migration control, then to deputy chairman of the Sovereignty Council after the 2019 revolution. The path is clear: the more impunity, the more political influence.

While Kushayb was being tried in The Hague, Hilal was on a different path. Instead of accountability, he got a promotion

Areig Elhag

As the civil war escalated, Dagalo built complex political alliances, most importantly with Abdulaziz Al-Hilu, chairman of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North, who initially refused to deal with or meet the Rapid Support Forces leader. This year, the equation changed and Al-Hilu  his alliance with Dagalo in Nairobi and took the oath as Dagalo’s deputy in the presidential council of the parallel government.

In July, the Sudan Founding Alliance was announced — an alliance consisting of armed movements and several politicians who were part of the previous transitional government. They formed a parallel government and Dagalo took the oath as chairman of the presidential council in Nyala. Former Sovereignty Council member Mohammed Hassan Al-Ta’ishi was appointed prime minister. The alliance announced the appointment of ministers and governors in an attempt to give its authority an institutional character.

This parallel government has received no international recognition. The Arab League  the move and described it as “illegitimate,” while Sudan’s official UN mission confirmed that the international organization only recognizes the government based in Port Sudan. However, the announcement itself reflected a qualitative development: the Janjaweed had evolved from being an armed militia in 2003 to a semiregular force in 2010, a partner in power in 2019 and a political entity declaring a government in 2025.

Tracing a path that began in pre-2003 Darfur to the current war that started in 2023, the pattern of violence and forced displacement continues, even if the names and titles have changed. The militias that could be disavowed by the state transformed into regular forces, then into political entities aspiring to international recognition.

The story is not about Kushayb alone but an entire system that impunity allowed to grow and evolve until it reached what it is today. This delay in accountability did not come without a price. If Kushayb had been tried in 2007, if Hilal had been handed over to justice instead of being appointed an adviser and if Dagalo had faced accountability for his role in Darfur before becoming commander of a semiregular force, perhaps Sudan would be in a different place today. But impunity allowed the model to evolve, from militia to army, from war crime to political power.

• Areig Elhag is a journalist and researcher based in Washington.