��������

Israel and Hamas agreed to a ceasefire during talks with American, Turkish, Qatari, and Egyptian mediators. The first phase involves Israel stopping the bombing and withdrawing from Gaza to an agreed line. Hamas, in turn, will return all hostages within 72 hours of the agreement.

The question we must ask ourselves now is what prevents Israel from resuming its bombing campaign once the hostages are returned? And what can Arab and Islamic countries do to prevent such a scenario, which some might say is probable?

From the Hamas point of view, the hostages are the only card the group holds that provides leverage over Israel. It is also important to note that two years of war has greatly weakened the group. However, the situation on the ground pushed everyone to converge on US President Donald Trump’s plan; Gaza was undergoing a genocide, people were starving, and an immediate solution was needed.

There is little reason to believe that the ceasefire will successfully progress to the next phase, however. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu needed to accept the ceasefire because the pressure on his government was increasing, not only internationally but domestically as well, with the plight of the hostages providing fuel for opposition parties. However, we should not forget that during the past two ceasefire agreements, Israel recovered some of the hostages and then resumed its genocide.

We have also to remember that once the war ends, Netanyahu will face accountability. There has been no proper investigation into the Hamas-led Oct. 7 attacks. Some news outlets have recently alleged that forces surrounding Gaza were ordered to stand down at the time. If this is true, and if Netanyahu really allowed all this to help him avoid his own domestic woes, what will happen to him?

In addition to the potential repercussions of Oct. 7 there is the matter of the corruption charges he faces. There is also the issue of his fragile coalition government, which is torn between those who believe that Orthodox Jews, who currently are exempt from the national military service most Israelis are obliged to complete, should be conscripted and those who believe they should not. The war pushes all such issues into the background. Once he gets the hostages back, scoring a point against the opposition and appeasing the Israeli public, will he resume the war in Gaza? Maybe. Maybe he will return to pounding the territory. Or maybe he will open another front in the West Bank. Or Lebanon. Or Iran.

Whatever might happen, the most important thing right now is to make sure the ceasefire holds in Gaza, and to that end Trump is expected to maintain the pressure on Netanyahu to move beyond the first part of the agreement. When Trump was asked about this, he said the most important issue was to get the hostages home, and “then we will see.” This, however, prompted a sense of deja vu; ceasefire agreements in November 2023 and January 2025 proved to be short-lived.

In addition, pressure is not equivalent to guarantees. Israel can apply counterpressure to the US. It has a powerful political lobby working at full steam. This raises the question of what should Arab and Islamic countries be doing? What is their Plan B? What kind of pressure can they exert on Israel to ensure Netanyahu does not stray from the ceasefire?

Unless Israel believes there will be dire repercussions for breaking the ceasefire, it is likely to be short-lived.

Dr. Dania Koleilat Khatib

Turkiye has already said it will send forces to monitor the early stages of the truce. However, there are still no details about subsequent phases. Arabs and Muslims should heed the advice of  Colombian President Gustavo Petro, who in a speech to the UN General Assembly last month, called for the creation of an international force in Gaza through the General Assembly Resolution 377, also known as the “Uniting for Peace” resolution.

Israel should be made aware that if it does not comply with the peace plan and withdraw from Gaza, Arab and Islamic countries will push for action under Resolution 377, which potentially can override the power of veto held by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council by taking a resolution to the General Assembly for a vote on collective measures, including the use of armed force when necessary.

There might be pushback to the suggestion. Israel might react to such a threat with cynicism. United for Peace had been effective in the past when backed by a superpower, either the Soviet Union or the US. Here, Arab countries might allude to China, which seeks to play a bigger role in the Middle East and was the mediator and the security guarantor for the Saudi-Iran deal. Would the US like to see its allies increasingly warm to China? Not really.

Empty threats will not work. Arab and Islamic countries need to start organizing. Each country should engage with all states with which they have good relations and influence. The message must be clear: If Israel does not fully commit to the ceasefire there will be repercussions.

The pressure should not end with the ceasefire agreement; it should continue on the issue of achieving a Palestinian state. All Western countries should be encouraged to follow the lead of Spain, and others, that have clearly called for recognition of a Palestinian state and efforts to advance a two-state solution to the wider conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, with Gaza connected to the West Bank and free access to shipping through Gaza’s port.

The international popular pressure should not let up. It is as a result of popular protests that many Western countries began to put pressure on Israel to end the war in Gaza. As deliveries of aid are stepped up, humanitarian and other nongovernmental organizations, and the media, should be granted free access to the territory. The more reporting there is of the destruction, the state of famine and the condition of the Gazan people, the more pressure there will be on Western governments to compel Israel to maintain the ceasefire.

There should also be a clear, well-defined strategy for the ongoing ceasefire. The Arab and Islamic countries that mediated it should lead this effort. Unless Israel believes there will be dire repercussions for breaking the ceasefire, it is likely to be as short-lived as the November 2023 and January 2025 ones.

• Dr. Dania Koleilat Khatib is a specialist in US-Arab relations with a focus on lobbying. She is co-founder of the Research Center for Cooperation and Peace Building, a Lebanese nongovernmental organization focused on Track II.