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Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov is currently visiting Pyongyang for high-level talks with North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un. The relationship between the countries has grown significantly in recent years, underscored by a defense alliance treaty signed last year. Article 4 of that treaty commits both countries to supporting one another in the event of foreign invasion.

That clause has already been tested. After Ukrainian forces entered Russia’s Kursk Oblast last September, North Korea answered Moscow’s call for help by deploying thousands of troops to the region.

Even before this treaty, though, Russia and North Korea shared a long history of defense and economic ties dating back to the Cold War and Soviet times.

North Korea has supported Russia’s war against Ukraine in two primary ways: manpower and materiel. In terms of manpower, more than 10,000 North Korean troops were sent to Kursk to help retake territory seized by Ukrainian forces in late 2024.

This intervention came at a steep cost. Open-source intelligence estimates suggest about 4,000 North Korean soldiers were killed during the operation, approximately the size of a full brigade. These troops were drawn from North Korea’s special forces and led by some of Kim’s most trusted generals.

Their rules of engagement included a brutal provision: they were ordered to kill themselves rather than be taken prisoner. This is why social media feeds have been filled with images and videos of deceased North Korean soldiers, while only a handful have been captured alive.

According to senior Ukrainian officials, the North Korean forces performed poorly at first but quickly adapted. After suffering early losses, they learned fast on the battlefield, particularly in countering modern threats such drone attacks. By early this year, the assessment by Ukrainian troops was that many North Korean soldiers were more disciplined and better trained than their Russian counterparts.

So far, however, North Korean soldiers have operated only inside Russian territory. They have not yet been involved in offensive operations on Ukrainian soil.

North Korea’s materiel support to Russia has also been extensive. From the early stages of the war, ballistic missiles manufactured in North Korea have been used by Russian forces to strike Ukrainian cities. Since the deployment of North Korean troops, additional artillery and multi-launch rocket systems from the country have been observed in use alongside Russian forces.

North Korea has supported Russia’s war against Ukraine in two primary ways: manpower and materiel.

Luke Coffey

But the most critical contribution has come in the form of artillery shells and manufacturing capabilities. In a war defined by the use of mass artillery, North Korea has helped fill a massive shortfall in supplies, with Russia reportedly firing tens of thousands of shells each week.

North Korea’s willingness to expend its stockpiles, and to manufacture new materiel for Russia, is not without risk. Pyongyang must always keep one eye on the Korean Peninsula, especially its adversary to the south. Yet Kim appears willing to accept this gamble in exchange for key benefits from Moscow.

The most obvious question is therefore what is North Korea getting in return? Firstly, it is believed to be receiving advanced technology from Russia, especially in the form of strategic weapons. Open-source reporting indicates that Moscow has shared submarine-launched ballistic missile technology with Pyongyang, something that is of major importance to North Korea’s long-term nuclear-deterrence strategy.

Secondly, North Korea has reportedly received drone technology, including the designs and know-how for loitering munitions, such as the Russian Lancet and the Iranian-origin Shahed drone platform, which Moscow now produces under license. These drones have already changed battlefield dynamics in Ukraine and could similarly enhance North Korea’s future capabilities.

But beyond the materiel and technological gains, North Korea is also benefiting from the geopolitical implications of helping Russia. For Kim, the opportunity for his soldiers to gain real-world combat experience is, despite the high casualty rate, a rare opportunity. In a society such as North Korea’s, in which public dissent is suppressed and military sacrifice is glorified, this is politically sustainable.

Furthermore, Pyongyang’s involvement in the conflict complicates the strategic picture for Washington. The US supports Ukraine and also maintains a strong military presence on the Korean Peninsula to deter North Korean aggression. Any steps Kim can take to increase the pressure on the US, either in Europe or Asia, serve his interests.

Looking ahead, the future of Russian-North Korean cooperation will likely be high on Lavrov’s agenda during his visit. Reports suggest that Pyongyang might be preparing to send as many as 30,000 additional troops to assist Moscow. This time, they might not be confined to defensive operations within Russian territory. If North Korean forces begin to participate in offensive operations inside Ukraine, it would mark a dangerous escalation.

Even if the forces stop short of crossing into Ukraine, new deployments are expected. North Korea might send engineering troops with reconstruction expertise to help Russia rebuild damaged infrastructure in Kursk Oblast, for example. These forces could also assist in fortifying Russia’s border with Ukraine, helping to build new defensive lines.

One thing is clear: The Russian-North Korean relationship is likely to deepen further. North Korea’s growing involvement in support of Russia’s war in Ukraine is a stark reminder that global conflicts are increasingly interconnected. The security of Eastern Europe cannot be separated from the security dynamics of East Asia.

This alignment between Moscow and Pyongyang presents a challenge not only for Ukraine, but for the broader international community. US President Donald Trump, who has made it a priority to pursue a negotiated settlement to the war, cannot ignore the role that North Korea is now playing. Any serious diplomatic strategy must factor in not only Russia’s behavior but also its external enablers.

The outcome of Lavrov’s trip will determine how deeply both sides want to take their current relationship.

• Luke Coffey is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute.X: @LukeDCoffey.