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The Trump administration’s decision to withdraw 500 troops from eastern Syria in April, and its stated aim of drawing down more, appears part of a broader shift in US policy toward Syria. In the immediate aftermath of Bashar Assad’s fall, Washington seemed hostile toward the new regime. Officials expressed concern about the background of Syria’s new president, Ahmad Al-Sharaa, and warned Damascus about the fate of Syria’s minorities and the possible resurgence of Daesh. Yet, in recent months, President Donald Trump has agreed to drop sanctions on Syria and appointed a new envoy to Damascus, as well as reducing the US’ military footprint in the east.

This does not necessarily indicate that the US is embracing Al-Sharaa, despite Trump’s complimentary words when they met in Riyadh. Instead, it seems the White House is “de-prioritizing” Syria: reducing both its hostility, in the form of economic and diplomatic sanctions, and its military presence. This will be welcomed by Damascus, but also by the new leadership’s principal regional ally, Turkiye. Indeed, Ankara appears to be the major beneficiary of the new US approach.

The de-prioritizing has three primary strands. The first was to begin lifting sanctions. After his surprising meeting with Al-Sharaa in ��������, Trump agreed to remove the sanctions crippling Syria’s economy, arguing it “would give them a chance.” As well as granting immediate sanction relief in late May, the White House is reportedly preparing an executive order that will permanently rescind a raft of economic restrictions.

The second strand is direct engagement with the new regime. After meeting Al-Sharaa in person, Trump appointed the US’ ambassador to Turkiye, Tom Barrack, as special envoy to Syria. Within days, Barrack travelled to Damascus and symbolically raised the Stars and Stripes over the US ambassador’s residence there, the first time it had flown since Washington closed the embassy at the height of Syria’s civil war in 2012.

It seems the White House is ‘de-prioritizing’ Syria: reducing both its hostility and its military presence

Christopher Phillips

The third strand is a reduction in troop numbers in eastern Syria. As well as removing 500 of the 2,000 troops in recent weeks, US forces are cutting their number of military bases from eight to one. There are further plans to lower the number of troops to under 1,000, with Trump himself keen to remove all US forces. Combined, these changes suggest Washington is, as Trump said, willing to give the new regime a chance and that it is not interested in being a prominent player in post-Assad Syria.

These shifts reflect Trump’s apparent change in approach to the Middle East since his tour of the Gulf in May. His general preference, as in his first term, is to reduce the US’ footprint in the region, while prioritizing opportunities that increase US trade. He remains concerned with confronting Iran over its nuclear deal and offering broad protection to Israel but, beyond these core concerns, he seems willing to allow key allies like �������� and Turkiye to take the lead in regional matters that do not interest him.

Syria falls within this latter category. With the economy in a poor state, there are few opportunities for Trump to make money for now — despite the appeal of building a Trump Tower in Damascus — and, with Iran having exited the scene, staying in eastern Syria to frustrate Tehran has lost its salience. Israel remains concerned with events in Syria, having launched several raids since the fall of Assad, arguing it is concerned about protecting the Druze community. However, Trump has shown signs of frustration with Benjamin Netanyahu in recent weeks, suggesting Washington will not let Israeli opposition to Al-Sharaa direct its approach to Damascus.

But if one US regional ally will be somewhat frustrated by the new approach to Syria, another will be delighted. Turkiye benefits from all three of the US policy changes.

Turkiye is well placed to benefit from any Syrian reconstruction, with its energy and construction companies lined up to play a prominent role. Trump lifting the sanctions removes any barriers to Turkish companies pouring into Syria, which would provide a much-needed boost to Turkiye’s flagging economy.

Trump meeting Al-Sharaa gives Turkiye’s ally increased legitimacy, making it easier for Syria to be reintegrated

Christopher Phillips

The US’ engagement with Damascus is similarly beneficial. Trump meeting Al-Sharaa gives Turkiye’s ally increased legitimacy, making it easier for Syria to be reintegrated into the international community, which would also benefit Ankara. Moreover, Trump’s appointment of Barrack as Damascus envoy, a role he will perform alongside his ambassadorship to Turkiye, is a major boost. Barrack is believed to be sympathetic to Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s government and playing the dual roles means he is more likely to view Syria through how it relates to Turkiye.

But the biggest benefit for Ankara is the drawing down in the east, something Erdogan has wanted for years. The US has already put serious pressure on its eastern Syrian ally, the Syrian Democratic Forces, to integrate into Al-Sharaa’s new leadership and reducing troop numbers puts them in an even more precarious position. Ankara has long sought the destruction or dissolution of the SDF, so the less US protection they have, the more the SDF’s leaders will feel compelled to abandon the goals of autonomy that Turkiye so strongly opposes.

Turkiye’s recent forming of an anti-Daesh coalition with Iraq, Jordan and Syria is similarly part of a wider strategy to convince the US that Ankara can lead anti-Daesh operations in the region, lessening Washington’s need to back the SDF.

The question, of course, is whether Trump and his administration recognize that Turkiye benefits from its new position on Syria, and whether it cares. One reading is that Erdogan has skillfully manipulated Trump, who is known to like the Turkish president. But another reading is that Trump is aware of the benefits but is happy to empower Turkiye in Syria — and hold Ankara to account if things go wrong. Whatever the truth, Turkiye is reaping the rewards of Washington’s new approach to Syria. However, with this power could come responsibility for Ankara if the situation worsens.

• Christopher Phillips is professor of international relations at Queen Mary University of London and author of “Battleground: Ten Conflicts that Explain the New Middle East.” X: @cjophillips