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Vladimir Putin last week rolled out the red carpet for Syria’s interim President Ahmad Al-Sharaa. For years, Al-Sharaa had fought to overthrow the Russian-backed Bashar Assad. Now, Putin has welcomed with open arms the man who toppled his closest regional ally, while Assad remains in hiding somewhere in the Russian capital, granted asylum after fleeing Syria last December.

Days before Al-Sharaa’s visit, Moscow had postponed its flagship Russia-Arab summit after only two of 22 invited leaders confirmed their attendance. The Kremlin viewed the summit as one of the year’s most important foreign policy initiatives, a chance to signal that Russia still commands support and influence across the Arab world.

The empty chairs tell a different story and Al-Sharaa’s welcome demonstrates Russia’s acceptance, however begrudging, of realpolitik. In the meeting, the Syrian president was clear that his administration seeks to “restore and redefine” the relationship on new terms that respect its sovereignty and independence. Moscow, despite its loyalties to the former regime, chose to ensure the continuation of the two countries’ “special” relationship.

Russia has also attempted to curry Arab favor with increasingly sharp rhetoric on Israel, in what appears to be an effort to undercut the US at a pivotal moment for the nation’s policy in the Middle East. But the Kremlin failed to expand Russia’s diplomatic role. Arab states appear to prefer US President Donald Trump’s transactional approach and concrete outcomes, which culminated in this month’s ceasefire deal between Hamas and Israel, over rhetoric and symbolism.

Moscow’s diplomatic struggles are compounded by growing military constraints, forcing a shift from its long-standing expansionist policy to one of preservation. Last week’s negotiations with Al-Sharaa followed the Syrian government’s termination of a treaty that granted Russia a long-term military presence in Tartus. To surrender its bases in Syria would be devastating for Russia in the region — so much so that Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov indicated Moscow is willing to restructure the mission from a military to a multifunctional role, even suggesting a “humanitarian logistics hub.” The suggestion represents a significant departure from Russia’s traditional approach and a huge tactical concession.

In tandem, the Wagner Group’s operational capacity has collapsed. Leadership decapitation, major defeats, resource diversion to Ukraine and withdrawal from key fronts, including Sudan and Mali, have left it operating with reduced personnel across a narrower geographic footprint.

Resources diverted to Ukraine and Russia’s damaged reputation as a reliable security provider have forced Moscow to abandon its aspirations for regional leadership. Instead, it is concentrating on bilateral relationships where it offers unique value, in what appears to be an acknowledgment of its limited capabilities. Its policy in the Arab world now seeks to build influence through long-term infrastructure and industrial projects that create mutual dependencies.

In Morocco, a joint intergovernmental commission last week covered agriculture, energy, transport, education and tourism, framed as a “new strategic dynamic.” The high-level talks renewed fisheries agreements and explored investment opportunities. Monumentally, on the Western Sahara, Russia signaled for the first time its potential openness to support the autonomy proposal.

Arab states appear to prefer US President Donald Trump’s transactional approach and concrete outcomes.

Zaid M. Belbagi

In Sudan, Russia is securing a Red Sea naval base as a hedge against the uncertain future of its Syrian operations. The base would host up to 300 troops and four navy ships, including nuclear-powered vessels. Twelve percent of global trade passes through the Red Sea, making Port Sudan well positioned for power projection. Russia has sought this foothold for more than a decade, initially through Wagner Group’s ties to the Rapid Support Forces, then pivoting to support the Sudanese Armed Forces, which control the coastline, in exchange for base access.

Egypt remains heavily dependent on Russia. In May, the two countries signed an agreement establishing a Russian industrial zone in the Suez Canal. The El-Dabaa nuclear power project creates deep technological dependence on Russian expertise for fuel supply, maintenance and operations training. Nuclear cooperation is notoriously sticky. Once committed to Russian reactor technology, countries typically remain locked into Russian fuel cycles for the facility’s 60-plus-year lifespan.

Egypt accounted for 19 percent of Russian arms exports in 2020-24, making it one of the country’s most significant defense clients. Yet it also receives $1.3 billion in US military aid annually and has been a cornerstone of America’s Middle East strategy since the Camp David Accords. Historical purchases of Russian systems that complement rather than replace US equipment have worked as a hedge. But reports of potential Su-35 fighter jet purchases may cross a red line with Washington, as the advanced aircraft would compromise US military technology if Russian and American systems operated in integrated environments.

Russia is also leveraging institutional frameworks to help it exert influence in the region. Egypt, the UAE and Iran joining BRICS significantly increases the bloc’s economic and political weight, as its collective gross domestic product now exceeds $16 trillion with a population of more than 2.5 billion.

When Putin took over the rotating leadership in 2024, he emphasized the group’s commitment to strengthening multilateralism for equitable global development. The expansion was touted as heralding a post-Western world order in which the “global majority” is finally empowered. In 2025, this narrative rings hollow, given the Trump administration’s recent and continuing successes. However, OPEC+ provides another forum where Russia coordinates with Middle East and North African countries on oil policy, maintaining diplomatic influence through ongoing collaboration.

Russia’s approach toward the Arab world reflects a necessary recalibration driven less by ideological partnership, convening power and military capacity. Moscow now relies on niche capabilities in military equipment and nuclear technologies, as well as participation in multilateral forums, to bolster its ties with nations in the Middle East and North Africa.

States in the region, for their part, increasingly view Russia as a useful hedge and leverage tool with the West. This diminished yet persistent role is one that Moscow can realistically sustain. Russia’s willingness to work with any nation on any ideological terms ensures it retains relevance even as its regional influence shrinks.

• Zaid M. Belbagi is a political commentator and an adviser to private clients between London and the Gulf Cooperation Council. X: @Moulay_Zaid