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When, back in late August, the E3 — the UK, France and Germany — notified the UN that Iran was in breach of its obligations under the 2015 nuclear agreement, better known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which imposed severe restrictions on Iran’s nuclear activities, the last nail was about to be hammered into this agreement’s coffin. A month later, as required by procedures, the notification led to the activation of the “snapback” mechanism, imposing a wide range of sanctions on the regime in Tehran due to what the E3 called “Iran’s persistent and significant nonperformance of its JCPOA commitments.”

There is hardly anyone who genuinely believes that imposing more sanctions on Iran is going to achieve an immediate impact. But after several years, the US, which unilaterally abandoned the JCPOA in 2018, and Europe are now more aligned in their efforts to prevent Iran from developing nuclear military capability. But will this necessarily lead to the desired result of Tehran rethinking its nuclear strategy?

This is unlikely because, unless there is a diplomatic path out of this crisis, it may have the opposite effect of reinforcing its rulers’ intransigence, especially at a time when the Iranian leadership is still licking its wounds from the June war with Israel, which exposed its security vulnerabilities after its nuclear facilities took a big hit.

Sustaining the agreement would have required negotiations to start well before the sunset clause came into effect

Yossi Mekelberg

President Donald Trump’s 2018 decision to withdraw from the JCPOA, largely influenced by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, destined the agreement to remain on life support until the triggering of the “snapback” clause effectively pronounced it officially dead. In this instance, the urgency to trigger this mechanism was not due to signs of Iran accelerating its march toward nuclear military capability but rather because of the nature of the 2015 deal.

Under the nuclear accord, Iran and world powers agreed to a “sunset” clause that meant certain restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program would expire by October 2025. It might have been an oversight by those who agreed to it at the time. Or maybe it stemmed from a belief that 10 years would create enough mutual trust to move from an agreement that was transactional to a transformational one that would change the nature of relations between Iran and the world and would therefore end with Iran abandoning its wish to develop nuclear weapons.

This transition from transactional to transformational has unfortunately not happened. Moreover, from a tactical negotiating perspective, it enabled Iran’s president at the time, Hassan Rouhani, to promote the deal domestically as one that, after a decade of compliance, would allow Iran’s civilian nuclear program to operate without restrictions.

It might be a case of naivety, a reflection of the difference between how Tehran operates compared to the West, but also a tendency to kick the can down the road that enabled it to reach a deal but then fail to maintain not only the letter of the agreement but also the spirit of it. Sustaining the agreement would have required both sides to start negotiating well before the sunset clause came into effect to find a mutually beneficial replacement.

Instead, such talks were postponed. With the US uninterested and the JCPOA expiring on Oct. 18, this time constraint pushed the E3 to reimpose sanctions. But this should only be a prelude to the search for a new agreement.

The timing of the reimposition of sanctions, so close to the June war, suggests an inevitable link, even if the two are not directly connected. Yet, while Israel and the US repeatedly claim that the 12-day war severely set back the Iranian nuclear program, there is no clear evidence. And of special concern is the status of a stockpile of 408 kg of uranium enriched to close to weapons-grade level, which possibly remains beneath the rubble of the nuclear facility bombed by Israel and the US, or is hidden somewhere else.

Until the US’ withdrawal from the agreement, Iran’s nuclear program was generally controlled

Yossi Mekelberg

Despite the damage to its nuclear facilities and the decimation of the top echelon of the country’s security forces, Iran’s position on inspection has hardened and it is not authorizing inspectors to regain access to Iran’s nuclear sites, nor has it produced and transmitted to the International Atomic Energy Agency a report accounting for that stockpile of highly enriched uranium.

For all intents and purposes, the JCPOA collapsed with the US decision to abandon it unilaterally, achieving the opposite of what the agreement was intended to achieve. Until the US’ withdrawal from the agreement, Iran’s nuclear program was generally controlled. But in the following years, and by the Iranian regime’s own admission, the enrichment process was accelerated. And now, without any binding agreement, containing Iran’s march toward developing nuclear military capability will be extremely difficult.

However, since Iran’s air defenses took a significant hit during the June war, this might tempt Israel, or even the US, to try to complete the mission of eliminating Iran’s nuclear program. What might also encourage such an approach is the weakening of the so-called Axis of Resistance, including Hamas or Hezbollah, and Syria’s exit from Iran’s orbit after the fall of the Assad regime.

On the other hand, these developments have empowered Iran’s hard-liners to demand an acceleration of the nuclear program to overcome the country’s security vulnerability and to take courage from their demonstrated ability to inflict hurt deep into Israel, including the latter’s major strategic assets. Acting on this might be a dangerous miscalculation, but the idea still prevails within the leadership in Tehran.

Therefore, although escalation is not inevitable, sanctions are not a long-term solution unless all sides recognize the opportunity to return to diplomatic negotiations. Beyond the posturing and accusatory rhetoric between Iran and the West, the least-worst alternative for both sides is to enter a new round of the talks, as arduous and laborious as these efforts are expected to be.

Long-term sanctions make the lives of ordinary people even more difficult and, in the case of Iran, they are strengthening the hold of the Revolutionary Guards over the country’s economy. A new deal with tight regimes of inspection and monitoring of Iran’s nuclear facilities would allow for the eventual removal of sanctions and could create space for Tehran to cease being an unsettling element in the region, which could lead to an improvement in the regional security architecture.

• Yossi Mekelberg is professor of international relations and an associate fellow of the MENA Program at Chatham House. X: @YMekelberg