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The statement issued by the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Thursday, which welcomed the Gaza agreement and the beginning of the implementation of the first phase of US President Donald Trump’s proposal, indicates that Riyadh is treating the ceasefire as a transition point to a new phase. This phase is expected to see a halt to the genocide committed by Israeli occupation forces over the past two years and open a path toward managing the Strip in the aftermath of a war that has left massive destruction and caused a famine that the occupation authorities used as a weapon and as collective punishment against the Palestinians.
The Saudi statement emphasized that Trump’s proposal seeks to “pave the way for a comprehensive and just peace.” This, from Riyadh’s perspective, means that the Palestinians must have their independent state with East Jerusalem as its capital, in accordance with the 1967 borders. This state has been called for by a large international coalition, which ��������, in cooperation with France, worked to give strong diplomatic momentum, as manifested in the New York conference.
Although the Kingdom is aware that the extremist Israeli government insists on its position rejecting the two-state solution, Saudi policy appears steadfast and is anchored in international legitimacy. For this reason, last week’s statement stressed the importance of alleviating “the humanitarian suffering of the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip,” achieving “a full Israeli withdrawal,” restoring “security and stability,” and initiating “practical steps to achieve a just and comprehensive peace based on the two-state solution.”
In other words, it reaffirmed the legal framework of the Palestinian cause. This is not merely a moral or symbolic stance from Riyadh but rather it has become a roadmap for its foreign policy over the past two years.
The above calls for an objective reading of what the Kingdom can offer in the post-ceasefire phase in the Gaza Strip, without overlooking the fact that, despite the atmosphere of optimism, the scene remains unclear on several important points. This ambiguity may later be exploited by Israel to continue its expansionist policies and impose a fait accompli, which could lead to the collapse of the fragile truce.

Although the Kingdom is aware that Israel insists on its rejection of the two-state solution, Saudi policy appears steadfast.

Hassan Al-Mustafa

�������� can approach developments in Gaza through four interconnected axes: political, security, economic and humanitarian.
On the political front — despite the Kingdom’s success in rallying support for the two-state solution and its ability to craft a strong and persuasive diplomatic discourse — the most significant challenges lie in the absence of a genuine peace partner within the current right-wing Israeli government, on the one hand, and the lack of Palestinian unity on the other, despite the calls that have been made to hold Palestinian-Palestinian reconciliation meetings in Egypt.
The agreement between Israel and Hamas, as drafted by Washington, lacks a unified Palestinian executive body capable of issuing practical decisions and it is simultaneously susceptible to violations by the Israeli right. This dilemma is understood by ��������, which knows that any international commitment to a political solution depends on the ability of the Palestinian Authority to restore its security and administrative functions in Gaza, as well as on the Israelis not violating what has been agreed.
Therefore, it is likely that Riyadh will move toward an initiative to structurally support the PA by financing and reforming its institutions in a way that enables it to manage the Strip in the future. In parallel, �������� can urge Trump to pressure Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to adhere to all the provisions of the agreement and not to use flimsy pretexts to blow it up.
As for the security axis — related to temporary arrangements during the first phase and what follows, as well as the full Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in the coming weeks — here a dual dilemma appears. There is an absence of guarantees for a complete Israeli withdrawal without it retaining permanent strongpoints and observation posts, while the Palestinian capacity to fill the security vacuum is weak as a result of the disorder and the military strikes that Hamas suffered. Meanwhile, there is a limited number of suitable Palestinian security personnel despite Egypt and Jordan having trained several thousand police to take on tasks in the upcoming phase in the Strip.
�������� can play a role here by providing logistical support and security expertise to the PA, without this meaning it will have participation in the field in the Occupied Territories. Rather, it will be through channels that Riyadh views as consistent with its policies.
Regarding the economic axis linked to reconstruction, this will most likely not happen without an international donors conference, through which a clear and guaranteed mechanism of work will be set. This will most probably be conditioned on the real reform that the PA must undertake, as well as on a guarantee that Israel will not again destroy the Strip after its reconstruction; otherwise, reconstruction will be pointless.
As for the humanitarian relief axis, Riyadh stood up to Israel and opposed the accusations Tel Aviv directed at UNRWA and supported it financially. Therefore, the Kingdom will continue its support through official channels in the UN and also through the Saudi aid agency KSrelief by supporting education, healthcare and the rehabilitation of affected families, providing them with the assistance they need.
What �������� can do now is not support a temporary settlement of the conflict, but rather organize the resulting chaos in preparation for absorbing and addressing its negative effects over time through a network of intersecting interests that achieve a just and comprehensive peace for Palestinians and Israelis alike.
The success of this role depends on Riyadh’s ability to convert its economic and diplomatic weight into political influence over the international partners that are directly influential on the Palestinian file and to convince them that their interests and everyone’s interests lie in a true and sustainable peace. Only then can the postwar phase turn from a limited, fragile truce into the beginning of a new political process that gives hope to the Palestinians and to the peoples of the Middle East, despite the enormity of what has happened.

• Hassan Al-Mustafa is a Saudi writer and researcher interested in Islamic movements, the development of religious discourse, and the relationship between Gulf Cooperation Council states and Iran. X: @Halmustafa