Syria and Israel: From ideological hostility to pragmatic agreement

https://arab.news/85gv7
Just a few months ago, few would have believed that Damascus and Tel Aviv could find themselves on the verge of signing a security pact after more than half a century of hostility. For decades, Syria built its political identity on absolute rejection of peace with Israel. After the loss of the Golan Heights in 1967 and its unilateral annexation by Israel in 1981, Syrian leaders made “no peace, no recognition” their credo. They rejected any separate peace track, like Camp David, and tied any potential negotiations to a full withdrawal from the Golan. This was elevated into a sacred cause, enshrined in schoolbooks and official rhetoric, with Israel depicted not merely as a rival over territory but as an existential enemy. Negotiations with Israel were not simply avoided — they were taboo.
Yet, what was once unthinkable is now, according to well-placed leaks, weeks away. A US-brokered, Gulf-backed agreement is reportedly close, with an announcement penciled in for Sept. 25 at the UN General Assembly. Far from being a comprehensive peace, the proposed deal is framed as a limited nonaggression pact: Israel would refrain from attacking Syria in return for security guarantees, particularly concerning the Druze minority in the south. The terms also include demilitarization from the Golan to Sweida, a ban on advanced missile and air defense systems that could threaten Israel’s air dominance and a humanitarian corridor into Druze areas. In exchange, Syria would receive US and Gulf aid for reconstruction, while Israel would seek to block Turkish involvement in the rebuilding of the Syrian military.
The backdrop is nothing less than revolutionary. Bashar Assad’s downfall in December 2024 tore up the region’s assumptions. His successor, Ahmad Al-Sharaa — once the Islamist commander known as Abu Mohammed Al-Golani, who was branded a “terrorist” — came to power at the head of a fractured opposition alliance after a protracted civil war that ultimately led to the toppling of the Assad regime.
From his first days, Al-Sharaa sought to escape isolation by taking steps no previous Syrian leader would have dared
Dr. Abdellatif El-Menawy
From his first days, he sought to escape isolation by taking steps no previous Syrian leader would have dared. He expelled Iranian forces and Hezbollah, ending decades of dependency on Tehran, and set out to reframe Syria’s place in the region. Survival, not ideology, was his watchword.
“Syria does not want conflict with its neighbors,” he declared, adding that while full peace was not yet realistic, he would seize “any agreement that serves Syria and the region.” He urged the international community to press Israel to halt its strikes. He even admitted Syria’s intervention in Lebanon had been a “grave mistake,” a sharp break with the triumphalist slogans of the past.
Al-Sharaa’s pragmatism, however, is layered over extreme fragility. His Cabinet contains men with militant pasts, unsettling minorities at home and raising alarms in Israel. Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar insisted that they are still extremists, “even if some now wear suits.” Latakia has already seen clashes between Alawite militias and the Sunni-dominated army, while in Sweida, Druze communities have resisted attempts at forced subjugation, with bloody consequences. These crises weaken the government’s legitimacy, but they also create a shared interest with Israel: the protection of the Druze.
For Syrians, the appeal is obvious, though many remain adamant that no agreement can be legitimate without the return of the Golan
Dr. Abdellatif El-Menawy
Washington moved swiftly in early 2025 to seize the opportunity and prevent either a collapse or a renewed Iranian foothold. Veteran dealmaker Tom Barrack was dispatched as envoy, opening channels in Paris and Baku with Gulf involvement. In an unprecedented moment, Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Al-Shaibani sat down in Paris with Israel’s Ron Dermer to discuss security arrangements.
Publicly, Damascus struck a cautious tone, insisting there could be no peace without a return to the 1974 disengagement lines. Privately, however, talks moved forward. By August, Al-Sharaa acknowledged they were “advanced” and based on the old UN-mandated truce line. Israel, for its part, signaled conditional interest: normalization was possible if its “core security interests” were guaranteed, especially recognition of the Golan as Israeli territory.
The US and Gulf states have underwritten the process. Washington has already begun easing sanctions, while Abu Dhabi and Riyadh have promised funding for reconstruction in return for Syria’s continued estrangement from Tehran. In May, the US flag was symbolically raised over the ambassador’s residence in Damascus for the first time since 2012.
The leaked provisions stop well short of peace. They focus on preventing Syria from rearming, limiting its strategic options and containing Turkish ambitions, while offering humanitarian corridors and reconstruction aid. For Syrians exhausted by war, the appeal is obvious, though many remain adamant that no agreement can be legitimate without the return of the Golan. In Israel, responses are divided: some see opportunity, others warn against trusting men with Islamist roots. Still, security officials argue that bringing Syria into a regional framework is safer than leaving it to chaos. For the Gulf, the deal is a chance to bring Syria back into the Arab fold and seal its break with Iran.
Whether this moment represents a true strategic shift or merely a pause in hostilities remains to be seen. It could herald the birth of a new regional order under US and Arab sponsorship, with Syria reintegrated and Iran sidelined. But the Golan remains a time bomb: Israelis see it as theirs forever, Syrians have never relinquished it. The precariousness of Damascus’ new rulers further clouds the outlook. Yet, with such heavy US and Gulf investment, neither side will find it easy to walk away.
- Dr. Abdellatif El-Menawy has covered conflicts worldwide. X: @ALMenawy