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Whether described as hedging, balancing or bargaining, Turkiye’s policies toward the Western and non-Western worlds are shaped by different parameters, shifts and continuities. It is, without doubt, an approach that is difficult to decipher, both for observers and Turkiye’s counterparts.

Back in 2013, when Ankara joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a dialogue partner, it led to confusion and concern within the West, which Turkiye had traditionally been allied to. At the time, observers commented along the lines of: “This organization is the most serious opposition to NATO. On the one hand, you are a NATO member, but on the other, you want to become a member of an anti-NATO organization. This attitude has the potential to change the balance in the world.”

When Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan — who was serving as prime minister at the time — played the Shanghai Cooperation Organization card, many dismissed it as a mere bluff aimed at pressuring NATO and the EU, with which relations had stalled over various issues. However, the Turkish political elite was seriously exploring alternatives and now, more than a decade later, it has become clear that Ankara’s move was far more than just a bluff.

This is a strategic move to engage with non-Western powers at a time when US influence appears to be waning

Dr. Sinem Cengiz

Erdogan was in China this past week, attending the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit alongside several world leaders. But Turkiye is not on track to become a full member anytime soon. Its existing security commitments, particularly as a NATO member, make such a shift tough. Currently, Turkiye stands out as the only NATO member among the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s list of dialogue partners and the only country still formally pursuing EU accession. Similarly, Turkiye has become the first NATO member to formally express interest in joining BRICS, an economic bloc led by Russia and China under the leadership of Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping.

For Turkiye, holding observer status within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is significant. However, this is not an attempt to replace its Western engagements, but rather a strategic move to also engage with non-Western powers at a time when US influence appears to be waning. Erdogan reaffirmed this approach, saying that engagement with the organization should not be seen as an alternative to Turkiye’s NATO membership or its EU aspirations.

On the sidelines of the Tianjin summit, Erdogan held bilateral talks with the leaders of Russia, China and Iran. His meetings carry particular significance in the current geopolitical context. Although Russia has been cornered due to the war in Ukraine, Iran’s regional influence has diminished amid its war with Israel and China has largely kept its distance from these developments, Turkiye was geographically at the center of all these crises, from Syria to Israel to Ukraine, and, in many ways, the problems of these powers play to Ankara’s advantage.

Turkiye’s mediating between Russia and Ukraine, expanding ties with China and maintaining of a cordial relationship with Iran show how Ankara views its strategic flexibility. This provides it with leverage in its ties with Russia, China and Iran that the Western powers do not have. At the same time, despite all their grievances, it still has influence in Western capitals, which the Shanghai Cooperation Organization member states lack.

Turkiye’s approach to Russia, China and Iran differs significantly from that of the West. Ankara is capable of managing its relationship with Tehran as long as Iran does not directly threaten its core interests. The same logic applies to Russia. Turkiye does not view Moscow as a fundamental threat — while the two countries may clash on certain foreign policy issues, they have largely succeeded in managing their differences.

This reflects Turkiye’s multivector foreign policy, which prioritizes cooperation over rivalry and tension. This policy is not based on like-mindedness, but pragmatism and maintaining good relations with one, while not throwing its relationship with the other under the bus. A multivector foreign policy is not only practical for Turkiye but also beneficial for its middle power status, as it gives it the space to maintain a pragmatic equal distance from rival greater powers.

Turkiye has leverage in its ties with Russia, China and Iran that the Western powers do not have

Dr. Sinem Cengiz

In fact, with both Russia and Iran, Turkiye has demonstrated an approach that the West often cannot pursue: compartmentalization of issues. For example, despite supplying drones to Ukraine, Turkiye has maintained close ties with Moscow. While Western countries have imposed heavy sanctions on Russia, Turkiye’s exports to Moscow have surged. That said, Turkiye’s relationships with both its Western and non-Western partners are not without limits.

The Turkish leadership now argues that the country should not be confined to the Western camp alone, carving out a more flexible, multivector foreign policy, which is not always straightforward. This shift in foreign policy is closely tied to changes in the domestic political landscape, which drastically altered after 2016. Since then, Turkiye’s ruling political elite has not only been reshaping the country’s domestic landscape, but also its global engagements by moving beyond its traditional Western alignment, aiming to secure a seat at the table in both non-Western and Western capitals.

This is a policy that is distinct from its predecessors. This shift is driven by a growing recognition that the global center of gravity is gradually moving from West to non-West. It also reflects how the current political elites view the international system based on their own values and perceptions.

Unlike many observers, I do not see Turkiye as trying to build bridges between non-West and West; rather, it appears to be pursuing a dual-track strategy, engaging with each side based on separate agendas. Thus, Turkiye’s multivector policy is both a necessity due to international dynamics and a choice of its ruling political elite.

• Dr. Sinem Cengiz is a Turkish political analyst who specializes in Turkiye’s relations with the Middle East. X: @SinemCngz