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Raising the Arab appetite for greater political and economic support for Lebanon is no easy task. Indeed, their list of disappointments is long: Lebanon’s chronically tenuous assertion of its sovereignty, the clientelist politics of many Lebanese elites, and its history of exploiting Arab aid to score domestic points…

None of that negates this essential fact: If the Arab states do not raise the level of their engagement with Lebanon now, as a new political equation takes shape, the ensuing vacuum would inevitably be filled by Iran, Israel or chaos itself.

We should be in agreement that there is nothing on the Lebanese scene to suggest that tomorrow, with a single decisive blow, Hezbollah’s arms and its waning influence could be wiped out, as happened to the Assad regime in Syria.

The road ahead is far more winding. Hezbollah is slowly withering away. It is not the only one on a slow trajectory of decline; the other transnational projects in the Levant are also dying slowly. The age of its absolute hegemony has certainly ended, though, and after having once seemed untouchable, the foundations of Hezbollah’s grip over Lebanon have shattered following the military defeats that the party and its backers have suffered.

Here, however, comes the catch-22: a slow death is often more dangerous than a sudden collapse. The gradual erosion of an armed faction that manages to avoid imploding usually engenders years of paralysis, political blackmail, economic stagnation and a society oscillating between fears of an uncertain future and nostalgia for an imaginary past sense of stability. Such turbulence is a recipe for lethal settlements.

The gradual erosion of an armed faction that manages to avoid imploding usually engenders years of paralysis

Nadim Koteich

Moreover, recent history reminds us that waiting for Lebanon to address the challenge of Hezbollah’s arms on its own (in anticipation of a shift in the domestic balance of power or Iran’s retreat) has only accelerated Lebanon’s collapse, leaving the state stripped of tools and without any protection.

Some argue that Arab disengagement, costly as it was, has played a role in creating the shift we are seeing today. Left to bleed out from its confrontations and wars, Hezbollah has reached a stage of attrition; its hegemony is waning and the Lebanese public can now distinguish between its real allies and adversaries more clearly. There is merit to this argument. Nonetheless, at this juncture, the priority is not to justify past actions but to build on the present. Hezbollah’s sharp decline must be turned into a political and economic opportunity to reinforce the state’s authority, preventing the emergence of a lethal void.

Sitting idly by poses great risks. Waiting for the party’s “death,” watching on “from the riverbank” until then, would be to squander the strategic opportunity offered by Hezbollah’s erosion. Early intervention — political, economic and security-related — is critical. Without it, nothing can prevent Lebanon from falling into yet another abyss, which would drastically undermine the positive dynamics we are seeing elsewhere in the region.

This issue does not only concern the Lebanese. Hezbollah’s slow decay cannot be understood in isolation from recent developments in Syria, particularly since the fall of the Damascus regime. Lebanon’s political future cannot be redesigned in a vacuum. Change in Lebanon can only come as one part of a broader postwar reconfiguration of the Levant: Syria without Assad, Iraq redefining its political identity and Iran bogged down in its own crises and apprehensions.

Lebanon must not be treated like an island. It is one piece of a regional mosaic that is currently being redrawn and a comprehensive strategy that goes beyond ad hoc measures is needed.

Change in Lebanon can only come as one part of a broader postwar reconfiguration of the Levant

Nadim Koteich

In fact, Lebanon’s political shift would not have been possible without ��������’s efforts; its political push played a decisive role in bringing the country’s current prime minister and president to power. To safeguard and consolidate this achievement, Arab states must go further. Support for the Lebanese state should be strengthened, albeit gradually and on the condition that certain steps are taken.

Support entails financing the reconstruction of essential public services, especially electricity, with a transparent oversight mechanism put in place; investing in the army and internal security forces to empower them as unifying, professional institutions; and coordinating Lebanon’s engagement with a “new Syria” to establish a new balance of power across the Levant.

The struggle of the Lebanese must be driven by clear political and economic aspirations. Without a light they can see at the end of the tunnel, the Lebanese would be hostage to the false promise of “stability,” perpetuating the cycle of acquiescence to a militia to avoid shattering its fragile civil peace.

The slow death of Hezbollah may seem like good news to those who have been worn out by its hegemony. If this process is left unmanaged and if Lebanon is supported through an Arab framework, it faces the far graver risk of perpetual collapse. Nothing is more dangerous than assuming that the region can simply “wait it out.” Hezbollah will not be knocked out by a single blow; it will perish through a protracted process of erosion, while the disorder it leaves behind could endure for years.

The alternative is accelerating the process and seizing this moment to render Hezbollah’s attrition the cornerstone of a new political architecture in Lebanon that is organically linked to restructuring the political landscape in Syria and Iraq, thereby cutting the regional project of hegemony at the root.

This is a rare moment in the modern history of the Levant. We have an opportunity to build a more balanced regional order, but it could also slip away from us, as so many others have before.

• Nadim Koteich is the general manager of Sky News Arabia. X: @NadimKoteich