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The latest war in the Middle East, both in terms of the course it took and its outcomes, resembled an earthquake. It was the latest of the earthquakes to hit the region: following the 1967 war, the 1973 war, Anwar Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem, the victory of the Iranian revolution and the US invasion of Iraq, to give a few examples. Earthquakes tend to change the trajectory of nations and the configuration of maps. Especially consequential in this regard are the conclusions that decision-makers draw from their assessment of the epicenter and its surroundings.

One day, I was going over Dr. Osama Al-Baz’s journey with him. President Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem and its aftermath was the first issue President Hosni Mubarak’s chief of staff and I discussed. He told me the story of Sadat’s visit to Damascus before the famous trip. He told me about the visible discomfort he had seen on President Hafez Assad’s face after his guest informed him of his decision.

He then cited Sadat, saying that a leader must sometimes make difficult and unpopular decisions if he concludes that it is vital to his country’s future. Sadat added that he respected Assad’s decision to prioritize the stability and popular standing of his regime. However, he also spoke of his apprehension for Syria, as he feared the latter could be compelled to take the path of peace later on, accepting even more unpalatable terms than it could have obtained if Assad had joined Egypt. The same, he said, applied to Yasser Arafat.

Al-Baz said that Sadat came up with the idea of visiting Jerusalem, not the Americans. It was the conclusion he drew from his reading of Egypt’s economic trajectory and its need for peace, as well as his reading of the balance of power, the strategic relationship between the US and Israel, and the Soviet Union’s decline. He added that short-sighted policies only serve to perpetuate suffering: our countries must join the march of progress and development; they must strive to reclaim their rights without artillery, corpses and carnage.

Short-sighted politics amounts to leaving the resolution of crises in the hands of a doctor called ‘time’

Ghassan Charbel

Al-Baz’s remarks came to mind as I followed the trajectory Syria has taken, deciding to withdraw, at least militarily, from this conflict. Our conversation also came to me as I watched Israeli jets raining death on the Palestinians, who have resorted to banging pots and pans in the hope of bringing an end to the famine and the suffering of their children in Gaza.

I was also struck by Al-Baz’s remarks toward the end of our second session. He felt that he had gone too far in praising Sadat when he was serving Mubarak. He glanced at the walls of his office and said, “I’ll say more over dinner at the restaurant in Cairo,” seemingly hinting that the walls in our countries have ears.

His comments about short-sighted policy stood out to me. Short-sighted politics amounts to leaving the resolution of crises in the hands of a doctor called “time.” It is to prefer fleeting victories, regardless of their cost, to durable solutions and the gains they bring. Benjamin Netanyahu is a master of such policies and his have left the region bloodied. In his first meeting with Arafat, Netanyahu, with a blunt tone that verged on disrespectful, told the Palestinian leader that he did not support the Oslo Accords. He then did everything he could to push his legitimate Palestinian partner aside, chasing his dream of erasing the Palestinian people and seizing what remains of their land.

With regard to Oslo’s failure, we should also mention the role played by the suicide bombings of Hamas and Islamic Jihad. These operations led to the militarization of the Palestinian Intifada. Arafat had himself failed to resist the allure of militarization, which he felt would create a bulwark against the rising popularity of Hamas and Islamic Jihad.

Israeli society was beginning to gear toward the right at the time. Netanyahu’s political program was gaining ground. President Mahmoud Abbas tried to keep Palestinian decisions in the hands of the Palestinian Authority and the Palestine Liberation Organization, but shifting regional balances in the aftermath of the American invasion of Iraq drastically reduced his capacity to do so. Iran was developing its missile and tunnel programs, effectively placing the decision of war with Israel in its hands. As a result, the fate of Gaza, the West Bank, the Golan Heights and Lebanon became tied to the Iranian-Israeli conflict, and the years of proxy conflict between the two finally came to a head with the recent direct clashes.

Will the Trump administration conclude that Israel must be forced to take the path of peace with the Palestinians?

Ghassan Charbel

In recent years, the maps of several regional countries have seemed to hang in the balance. The side these maps would fall on seemed to hinge on the outcome of the conflict between Iran and Israel, and on the outcome of the deep, long-standing rivalry between the US and Iran. During this time, Tehran repeatedly told visitors, including the late Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, that it was ready to negotiate with the Americans on everything “from Afghanistan to Lebanon.” But “the tumor” (Israel) would not be included in any settlement, Iran emphasized, as its Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei consistently insisted on the need to eradicate it.

We are now watching truly horrifying scenes. The Israeli military machine is at the height of its powers. The chasm has never been bigger. Iran, meanwhile, has just watched its generals and scientists being buried after Israeli warplanes had dominated its airspace for days. The American strike on its nuclear facilities was a brutal and highly symbolic message, regardless of Tehran’s insistence that it had won the war.

It is clear that the US is the arbiter of the truce between Iran and Israel. It is also the only channel through which an agreement to end the Gaza massacre can pass. It is the only power capable of helping Lebanon if it chooses to rein in Israeli aggression. It alone can keep Iraq from going up in flames and can stabilize Syria’s new authorities. The question remains: will the Trump administration conclude that Israel must be forced to take the path of peace with the Palestinians?

The fate of the maps also depends on the conclusion Netanyahu draws from his wars on multiple fronts. It also depends on the lesson Khamenei sees in the funeral processions and the American offensive. Some calm is needed to determine whether any reassessment is possible.

Could a government capable of making a difficult decision be formed in Israel, putting the country on a path toward a two-state solution? Can Iran show that it is willing to return to a less risky, less confrontational approach?

The fate of the region’s nations and maps hinges on the conclusions that Trump, Netanyahu and Khamenei reach.

• Ghassan Charbel is editor-in-chief of Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper. X: @GhasanCharbel

This article first appeared in Asharq Al-Awsat.