https://arab.news/pqvft
In “The Sun Always Rises,” Ernest Hemingway wrote: “How did you go bankrupt? Two ways. Gradually, then suddenly.” This also applies to Francafrique — and the “suddenly” is happening in 2025.
France, which has historical ties in West Africa, has been losing influence throughout recent decades. But the last year has witnessed the closure of multiple military bases, all of which were the result of unilateral African decisions. In November 2024, Chad announced the closure of France’s military bases in the country and the exit of 1,000 soldiers. Then, in February, Paris lost its last base in Ivory Coast. And in July, the final French military presence in Senegal was also surrendered.
This is no doubt the end of Francafrique. Yet, will France be able to morph its influence into something new, which is less intrusive, or will this withdrawal leave a void?
It is undeniable that, if we go with the total French loss scenario, the vacuum will be filled, as nature and geopolitics have taught us. France’s influence went beyond the military, but if we were to focus on this side only, then we would notice that Russia has been pushing forward and sometimes dislodging France despite what is happening in Ukraine. The word “Russafrique” has started making appearances in regional politics and local media.
Recent decades have witnessed a powerful comeback from Moscow in Africa, with a focus on the Sahel and Central Africa
Khaled Abou Zahr
Now, we need to put things into perspective: it is not like Russia is a newcomer to Africa. It has its own historical spheres of influence dating back to the Soviet era, but at that time it was more focused on Southern and Eastern Africa.
It is evident that recent decades have witnessed a powerful comeback from Moscow in Africa, with a focus on the Sahel and Central Africa, leaving its old areas to China. Benefiting from France’s gradual loss of influence and the US’ distraction beyond humanitarian and development aid, Moscow has been able to exploit the general resentment toward colonial powers, which, strangely enough, was also fueled by Western officials from the left pushing ahead with their strategy.
Starting in 2020, Russia moved into the Sahel region, which was previously under French control. Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger all witnessed coups that saw them break with France and move toward closer alignment with Russia. In 2023, many thought that the death of Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin would lead Russia to lose all its gains. But, unsurprisingly, Wagner quickly shifted into the state-controlled Africa Corps as if nothing had happened. As a result, Russia is still pushing its influence. Will it be able to move further west and “conquer” the core of the old Francafrique? That is the real question.
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Russia is one of the main arms suppliers to Africa. From 2019 to 2023, Russia accounted for 24 percent of African arms imports, followed by the US with 16 percent, China with 13 percent and France with 10 percent. However, with its shift in focus toward domestic needs, Russia’s global arms exports dropped 53 percent in 2023 and France overtook it as the world’s second-largest exporter. But Russia still presents greater commercial flexibility, which has allowed it to maintain a consequential share of the military trade. There is no doubt that, for many African leaders, the “all the way” support Moscow offers to its allies plays a big role.
Even if Francafrique is dead, this does not and should not mean the end of France’s collaboration with Africa
Khaled Abou Zahr
It is nonetheless clear that there has been a Western capitulation. It is not only about military capacity but also a complete reassessment of France’s foreign policy. Paris has been caught between the will to continue leading and refreshing this leadership and a reassessment and criticism of past actions in its former African colonies, mainly pushed by left-leaning political parties. It has been like one step here and one step there, leading nowhere.
We need to be straightforward: this goes beyond what President Emmanuel Macron could have done. It is as clear as France’s withdrawal from Algeria in 1962. There is nothing to do. And sometimes it is better to accept the loss and move on rather than try to revive something that no longer exists. But it should avoid maintaining bitter relations, as is the case with Algiers.
Even if Francafrique is dead, this does not and should not mean the end of France’s collaboration with Africa. One thing is for sure: we can already see that the security situation in the Sahel, despite the military cooperation with Russia, has severely worsened and now represents a bigger threat, including to the countries that broke off their military cooperation with France. This, in turn, presents a risk not only for France but also for Europe generally. Perhaps this is the key to the next phase for Africa: a united European policy. It is now alongside its European counterparts that France could differentiate itself.
While relations with Africa for most European countries have meant transactions, even if they can be disguised as friendly relations between nations, a united EU policy that responds to the will of the African people and their leaders for greater agency and unity is something that should be assessed. This would be the best way to rebalance this theater and prevent the creation of a void that could become a security danger for the entire continent and beyond.
Despite complaints about the EU’s bureaucracy, it has created a case study for common policy and economic development. This knowhow should now be offered to African countries to answer their desire for independence and self-determination. It could also serve as a way for Europeans to act collectively and avoid future geopolitical crises.
- Khaled Abou Zahr is the founder of SpaceQuest Ventures, a space-focused investment platform. He is CEO of EurabiaMedia and editor of Al-Watan Al-Arabi.