Narendra Modi last month paid a seven-hour visit to Kyiv, the first visit by an Indian prime minister since Ukraine became a sovereign state in 1991. The visit took place just a few weeks after Modi鈥檚 high-profile visit to Moscow, where President Vladimir Putin had described Indo-Russian relations as 鈥渁 particularly privileged strategic partnership.鈥�

Since the start of the war in Ukraine in February 2022, India has refused to join Western nations in condemning the Russian invasion, despite New Delhi鈥檚 close political and economic ties with the US and its allies. Indian commentators have instead highlighted age-old defense, energy, economic and technological relations with Russia, which have largely remained in place. An Indian diplomat has described the Indian position as 鈥渁 perfect blend of realism, pragmatism and tactical flexibility.鈥�

Bilateral trade with Russia reached $65 billion in 2023, largely due to India鈥檚 oil imports, which reached a record 2.1 million barrels per day in May this year. Russia still meets 50 percent of the country鈥檚 defense needs, while India is presently seeking the S-400 air defense system, nuclear-powered submarines, stealth frigates, fighter aircraft, helicopters and light tanks.

Not surprisingly, Modi鈥檚 Moscow visit evoked criticisms. A US State Department spokesperson conveyed 鈥渃oncerns鈥� about the relationship, while Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky viewed the visit as a 鈥渄evastating blow to peace efforts鈥� and specifically conveyed his dismay at the Indian leader hugging 鈥渢he world鈥檚 most bloody criminal in Moscow.鈥�

Since the start of the war in Ukraine, India has refused to join Western nations in condemning the Russian invasion

Talmiz Ahmad

As part of an effort to reach out to non-Western nations, then-Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba had visited New Delhi in March. He encouraged India to play a larger role in helping to end the war. He also gratuitously reminded India of deepening Sino-Russian relations in the context of India鈥檚 ongoing border disputes with China.

This had little impact in New Delhi, as India participated in the 鈥淪ummit on Peace in Ukraine鈥� in Switzerland in June, but it refused to sign the joint declaration as Russia had not been invited to the conference. A little before Modi reached Kyiv, Ukrainian troops commenced their incursion into Russian territory in Kursk to strengthen their country鈥檚 bargaining position in later negotiations.

Modi鈥檚 visit to Kyiv took place against this fraught background. A senior Indian official said that the country had independent ties with both Russia and Ukraine and 鈥渨ould like to contribute in finding peaceful solutions to the conflict.鈥� In Kyiv, without naming any country, Modi addressed Ukrainian sensitivities by referring to innocent children being killed, saying that 鈥渢he heart bleeds and that pain is terrifying.鈥� Minister of External Affairs S. Jaishankar said India had conveyed an offer to assist in peace talks in a 鈥渧ery back and forth discussion鈥� between the leaders.

Modi and Zelensky signed a joint statement affirming their commitment 鈥渢o further bilateral relations鈥� and seek a 鈥渟trategic partnership in the future.鈥� The two countries agreed on the need to uphold international law, respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states and pursue the peaceful resolution of disputes through 鈥渄ialogue and diplomacy.鈥� The statement identified trade, agriculture, defense, education, science and technology and culture as areas for enhanced bilateral cooperation.

An overwhelming majority of the world鈥檚 nations do not accept the division of the world into 鈥榰s鈥� and 鈥榯hem鈥�

Talmiz Ahmad

Opinion is divided on the significance of the Modi visit. A US-based commentator viewed the visit as a 鈥渟ubtle shift鈥� away from Russia, noting the increasing value of India鈥檚 ties with the West, the decreasing role of Russia as India鈥檚 defense partner and Indian concerns relating to Sino-Russian ties. Another writer rather extravagantly thought that, with this visit, India was seeking to insert itself as a player in European and global geopolitical developments and emerge as a shaper of global security structures.

Other analysts have asserted that the visit would have no impact on India鈥檚 close and substantial ties with Russia. In their view, India sees no advantage in boosting the role of Europe in world affairs, as that would only strengthen Western hegemony and stunt the emergence of a multipolar world order in which India expects to play a leading role.

A few Indian commentators have gone overboard and suggested that India could be a mediator in the Ukraine conflict. Some have even said that Indian National Security Adviser Ajit Doval carried a peace plan with him when he visited Moscow last week for the BRICS meeting of security officials. None of this has any basis in reality. India has no appetite for mediation and, given the intransigent positions of the two sides (and those of Ukraine鈥檚 Western backers), it sees no scope for a peace process at this point.

After Modi鈥檚 visit to Moscow in July, the US ambassador in New Delhi had said that, 鈥渋n times of conflict, there is no such thing as strategic autonomy.鈥� This reflects the self-centered and discredited US view that, 鈥渋f you are not with us, you are against us.鈥� It ignores the fact that an overwhelming majority of the world鈥檚 nations do not accept the division of the world into 鈥渦s鈥� and 鈥渢hem鈥� and have no wish to join what is effectively the idea of a new cold war being promoted by Washington.

With Modi鈥檚 Kyiv visit, India has affirmed its commitment to strategic autonomy, while upholding the need for peace. India has also affirmed its place with the Global South in rejecting big power competition and promoting instead a multipolar order in which nations shape and pursue their interests without external pressures.

• Talmiz Ahmad is a former Indian diplomat.