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DUBAI: Global hunger edged down last year, but not in the Middle East. That divergence — driven by conflict, inflation, currency stress, and a heavy reliance on imports — is reshaping food security across Western Asia and North Africa, even as other regions recover.

According to “The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World” report published recently by five UN agencies, 8.2 percent of the global population experienced hunger in 2024, down from 8.5 percent in 2023.

But the headline hides widening regional gaps. In Africa, more than 20 percent of people — 307 million — faced hunger in 2024. In Western Asia, which includes several Middle Eastern countries, 12.7 percent of the population, or more than 39 million people, were affected.

The contrast with other parts of Asia is striking. “Improvements in South-Eastern and Southern Asia were largely driven by economic recovery, better affordability of healthy diets, and stronger social protection systems,” David Laborde, director of the Agrifood Economics Division at the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization, told Arab News.

That rebound has not reached the Middle East evenly. He noted that while “high income countries” like the UAE or �������� are exempt from any major food insecurities, “the rest of the region and particularly conflict-affected countries (like Lebanon and Syria) are contributors to the rising hunger trend due to displacement, disrupted supply chains, and economic vulnerability.”

Nowhere is the food crisis more acute than Gaza, where war has devastated basic systems. A recent assessment by FAO and the UN Satellite Centre found that only 1.5 percent of cropland is currently available for cultivation, down from 4.6 percent in April 2025.

Put differently, 98.5 percent of cropland is damaged, inaccessible, or both — a staggering figure in a territory of more than 2 million people.

The data, published in July, landed amid warnings from UN agencies of an impending famine. The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification reported that two of the three official indicators used to determine famine conditions were present in parts of the strip.

FAO, the World Food Programme, and UNICEF have cautioned that time is rapidly running out to mount a full-scale response, as nearly a quarter of Gaza’s population is enduring famine-like conditions, while the remainder face emergency levels of hunger.

The report does not break down the impact of individual conflicts, but Laborde is blunt about the drivers. Conditions are getting worse because of “persistent structural vulnerabilities, which include conflict, economic instability, and limited access to affordable food.”

He added: “This region has seen a continued rise in hunger, with the prevalence of undernourishment increasing to 12.7 in 2024, up from previous years.”

Those structural weaknesses — exposure to war, import dependence, currency fragility — collided with a series of global shocks. The report cites the COVID‑19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine as major triggers of global food commodity price spikes in 2021-22.

Some pressures have eased, but inflation’s aftershocks persist, especially where budgets and safety nets are already thin.

According to Laborde, the countries struggling most are those where “real wages have declined the most, food price inflation has surged, and access to healthy diets have deteriorated.”

He added: “Low-income and lower-middle-income countries, many of which are in the MENA region, have experienced food price inflation above 10 percent, which is strongly associated with rising food insecurity and child malnutrition.”

For Middle Eastern economies that import a large share of their food, price spikes hit with particular force. Beyond war and pandemic disruptions, Laborde points to “climate shocks in key bread baskets have led to higher food prices.

“For countries that were able to compensate for this food price increase through higher revenue from energy product sales, also impacted by the same crisis, the blow was limited.

“However, for the countries with more limited revenue” from exports of oil and natural gas, “the situation was more difficult to handle.”

If the region’s import bill is the first vulnerability, exchange rates are the second. The report highlights exchange-rate fluctuations and local currency depreciation as critical, non‑commodity drivers of food inflation.

This is especially relevant for “import-dependent economies (such as Western Asia) where a weaker local currency increases the cost of imported food and agricultural inputs,” said Laborde.

“When local currencies depreciate, the cost of these imports rises, directly affecting consumer prices and worsening food insecurity.”

Egypt offers a case study. Heavy reliance on wheat imports from Russia and Ukraine, combined with a severe foreign currency shortage, has driven food prices far beyond wage growth since mid‑2022.

In practical terms, “a shortage of foreign currency has made it more difficult to pay for imports, leading to higher import costs in local currency terms, rising consumer food prices, and reduced affordability of healthy diets for households,” Laborde said.

The result: Egyptians’ food purchasing power fell by 30 percent between the third quarter of 2022 and the last quarter of 2024.

Similar pressures are visible elsewhere. Syria, Yemen, and Iraq have recorded significant declines in real food wages since 2020, with unskilled wages still below early‑2020 levels — a reflection of persistent instability and the difficulty of rebuilding labor markets amid conflict.

Even when global prices cool, the Middle East does not always feel the relief. The region’s supply chains remain vulnerable to disrupted trade routes, heightened uncertainty in grain markets linked to the war in Ukraine, and hostilities in the Red Sea.

For countries like Egypt, these pressures feed directly into the food import bill, particularly for wheat — a staple with no easy substitute.

In an import‑dependent context, each additional week of shipping delays, insurance surcharges, or currency slippage translates into higher prices for bread, cooking oil, and other essentials.

The report also flags a quieter, but consequential, problem: market power. In theory, competitive markets transmit falling global prices quickly to consumers. In practice, market power — the ability of firms to influence prices or supply — can mute or delay those benefits.

Since 2022, many low- and lower‑middle‑income countries have experienced persistent inflation even as world prices cooled, suggesting domestic frictions at play.

These “distortions have been observed since 2022” and are “especially relevant in import-dependent regions like Western Asia and North Africa, where currency depreciation, limited competition, and supply chain bottlenecks can further entrench inflation,” Laborde said.

Beyond statistics, the social toll is mounting. Rising food prices hit the poorest households first, forcing trade‑offs between calories and quality — cheaper, less nutritious staples displacing diverse diets rich in protein and micronutrients.

That is why sustained double‑digit food inflation correlates with child malnutrition and worsens long‑term health outcomes, from anemia to stunting.

The consequences can also be gendered. In many Middle Eastern and North African contexts, women — who often manage household food budgets — absorb inflation by skipping meals or cutting their own portions to feed children.

When real wages drop and informal work dries up, coping strategies erode quickly.

All of this threatens the UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, especially its aims to end hunger, achieve food security and improve nutrition, and promote sustainable agriculture.

With the deadline fast approaching, Laborde urges governments to “stabilize food prices and protect vulnerable populations” by prioritizing “integrated fiscal and trade policy reforms,” delivered through “time-bound, targeted fiscal measures.”

These include “temporary tax relief on essential foods, scaled-up social protection (e.g. cash transfers) indexed to inflation and ensuring benefits reach consumers through transparent monitoring.”
 

CAIRO: A paramilitary fighting against Sudan’s military shelled a famine-stricken displacement camp in the western region of Dafur Saturday, killing at least 31 people, including seven children and a pregnant woman, a medical group said, in a second attack on the camp in less than a week.

The Rapid Support Forces artillery shelling of the Abu Shouk camp outside El-Fasher, the provincial capital of North Darfur province, also wounded 13 others, the Sudan Doctors Network said in a statement.

The Resistance Committees in el-Fasher, a grassroots group tracking the war, said RSF launched an hours-long “extensive artillery shelling” on the camp early morning.

It said in a Facebook post that the attack also resulted in severe damage to private properties and the camp’s infrastructure.

The RSF didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment.

The RSF attacked Abu Shouk last week and killed more than 40 people, as the paramilitaries have tried to seize el-Fasher, the military’s last stronghold in Darfur.

Abu-Shouk is one of two camps for displaced people outside El-Fasher. They have repeatedly been attacked by the RSF and their Janjwaeed allies, including a major offensive in April which killed hundreds of people and forced hundreds of thousands others to flee. Both camps Abu Shouk and Zamzam have been hit by famine.

Sudan’s civil war broke out in April 2023 over a power struggle between commanders of the military and the RSF. The fighting wrecked the Northeastern African country, forced about 14 million people out of their homes, and pushed some of its parts into famine.

Thousands of people were killed in the conflict and there have been atrocities, including mass killings and rape, particularly in Darfur. The International Criminal Court is investigating potential crimes and crimes against humanity in the conflict.